Command and Control in Crisis

Why DoW Modernization Must Meet the Movement of Civilian Emergency Systems

By E. J. Wasikowski – Vice President of Tribal Affairs and Strategy

Netmaker Communications, LLC.

Introduction: From Warfighting to Civilian Crisis Response

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)- now the Department of War (DoW) is undergoing one of the most ambitious transformations in its modern history: the modernization of its Command and Control (C2) infrastructure. Driven by rapidly evolving threats across cyber, space, and information domains, this shift is about more than battlefield dominance; it’s about speed, accuracy, and integration.

While military planners reimagine how to command forces in a joint, all-domain environment, a parallel revolution is unfolding in the civilian space. Next Generation 911 (NG9-1-1) and the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline are radically changing how civilians seek and receive help in emergencies. These systems, built on real-time data and IP-based communications, are evolving into the digital nerve centers of local crisis response.

The question is no longer whether military and civilian systems should work together — but how DoW can maintain its mission assurance in joint environments, even when disconnected from commercial infrastructure. During major crises or elevated DEFCON conditions, DoW networks may need to sever links to civilian systems entirely. Yet the Public Safety Communications (PSC) mission must continue uninterrupted, supporting DoW installations and communities worldwide.

Modernizing C2: From Radio Nets to AI-Driven Decisions

For decades, the DoW’s command systems were largely siloed and purpose-built for static domains and known threats. That model no longer works. Today’s military faces adversaries that are fast, unpredictable, and often asymmetric. In response, C2 modernization efforts like Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) aim to unify decision-making across services and sensors, allowing commanders to act with speed and confidence in both kinetic and non-kinetic operations.

Cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and secure edge networks are now considered essential components of C2. Projects like the Army’s Project Convergence and the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) are pioneering new ways to fuse data from satellites, drones, ships, and ground units into coherent, real-time operational pictures. This is not just about smarter warfighting; it’s about shortening the time between sensing and acting, even under contested conditions.

As Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist noted in the DoW Digital Modernization Strategy, effective C2 today requires more than command authority. It requires decision dominance.

Civilian Crisis Systems Are Modernizing Too

While the Pentagon pursues smarter C2 capabilities, civilian emergency systems are undergoing a parallel transformation. The era of analog 911 is coming to an end. NG9-1-1, now being deployed nationwide, replaces voice-only calls with multimedia communications, including video, text, real-time GPS, and even biometric data. These features are supported by a centralized set of IP-based network elements called Next Generation Core Services (NGCS), which manage call routing, location validation, and emergency service discovery. Dispatchers can now receive live video from a caller’s smartphone or access crash notification systems with precise location and injury data.

Similarly, the 2022 launch of the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline marked a pivotal shift in behavioral health response. Rather than defaulting to police or EMS, 988 routes callers to trained mental health professionals who can de-escalate crises, triage needs, or dispatch alternative response teams. It’s the beginning of a truly digital and deeply integrated national crisis system.

These changes are more than technical. They reflect a philosophical shift in how the country approaches emergencies, placing smarter infrastructure and targeted care at the center of public safety.

Where Military C2 and Civilian Emergency Systems Converge

Though their missions differ, modern DoW C2 systems and platforms like NG9-1-1 and 988 share several foundational needs: real-time situational awareness, secure communications, rapid triage, and coordination across distributed networks.

During large-scale events, such as cyberattacks, infrastructure failures, or natural disasters, military support is often requested under Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). These situations demand that C2 systems become interoperable with civilian agencies, from federal down to local levels.

Consider a ransomware attack that disables a city’s 911 system, prompting National Guard activation. Or a breach in hospital networks that simultaneously triggers alerts to 988 crisis lines and DoW cyber units. In these moments, having a unified operational picture becomes essential. The effectiveness of response depends on how well systems and agencies can collaborate.

The Interoperability Imperative

One of the most critical aspects of convergence between military and civilian systems is interoperability. It’s not enough for systems to modernize independently; they must be able to function together during high-pressure scenarios, exchanging data, commands, and operational context in real time.

Historically, the DoW viewed interoperability as a challenge within its own branches, among the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, and now Space Force. JADC2 was born to resolve that problem by weaving these distinct systems into a single decision architecture.

However, today’s landscape demands that interoperability go further, extending into civilian agencies. Local 911 call centers, public health departments, mobile crisis teams, and federal emergency systems must all be part of the same information environment. A video call routed through NG9-1-1 could, in certain scenarios, directly inform military decision-making. Likewise, threat intelligence from C2 systems might need to alert civilian emergency infrastructure about a developing incident.

The obstacle isn’t just technical. Interoperability is often hindered by mismatched procurement cycles, conflicting data standards, and outdated policy frameworks. Systems must be built not just to communicate, but to understand each other.

As one defense analyst recently put it, “We don’t just need better technology. We need a shared language — operationally and digitally.”

Cybersecurity: A Shared Vulnerability

Both defense and civilian systems now rely on increasingly connected digital infrastructures — a shared reality that also creates a shared vulnerability. Cybercriminals and state-sponsored actors understand this. They know that attacking a 911 call center or compromising a C2 dashboard can cause cascading disruptions across jurisdictions.

Cyber resilience must be treated as a joint operational priority. Both domains are investing in zero-trust architectures, AI-enhanced threat detection, and secure communications. However, if one system is compromised — say, a local NG9-1-1 center — and it cannot securely communicate with a DoW C2 platform, the delay or confusion could escalate the impact of the original threat.

PSC Mission Assurance in a Disconnected Environment

In peacetime and domestic emergencies, the interconnection between DoW C2 systems and civilian networks like NG9-1-1 and 988 is both strategic and beneficial. However, these links come with risks, particularly when operating conditions escalate.

During periods of heightened alert or conflict, such as a DEFCON-level change, DoW networks may be required to isolate from commercial systems. In such cases, mission continuity becomes a matter of prepositioned capability. The Public Safety Communications (PSC) mission, which includes emergency response on military installations globally, cannot depend on shared infrastructure that may become contested or compromised.

This is why resilient C2 must include a “disconnected mode.” Even in the absence of commercial backhaul, the DoW must maintain command pathways, emergency alerting, internal incident management, and integration with installation-level first responders. Technologies like private LTE, DoW-owned SATCOM, and hardened base infrastructure become essential, not optional.

NG9-1-1 and 988 systems may inform design decisions, but they cannot be relied upon during worst-case scenarios. The goal is selective interoperability — a model where DoW can operate as a federated partner during joint crises, while preserving autonomous capability when the mission demands it.

A Federated Vision for Crisis Command

Rather than merging all systems into a single architecture, the future lies in a federated model — one that allows agencies and branches to retain operational control while achieving coordinated response through shared protocols and real-time data exchange.

This could include a National Crisis Command Playbook outlining how military and civilian systems like C2, NG9-1-1, and 988 should collaborate during complex emergencies. It might also mean formalizing joint training exercises, simulating blended command environments, and co-developing standards for secure communications.

The goal is not centralization. It’s synchronization.

Conclusion: From Coordination to Convergence

Modernizing DoW C2 is a national security imperative. But in today’s complex threat landscape, that modernization must include the ability to interact with and support civilian emergency infrastructure — as well as the ability to isolate from it when the mission demands it.

The PSC mission is constant, regardless of infrastructure status, geographic location, or cyber posture. Future readiness will be defined not only by how quickly systems can interconnect, but by how effectively the DoW can command and respond independently when it must.

References

1.     U.S. Department of Defense. (2019). DoW Digital Modernization Strategy: DoW Information Resource Management Strategic Plan FY19–23.https://DoWcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/DigitalModernizationStrategy.pdf 

2.     CISA. (2021). Cybersecurity Considerations for NG911 Systems.https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cybersecurity-Considerations-for-NG9-1-1-Systems_508C.pdf

3.     NENA & DHS. (2022). NG9-1-1 and Cybersecurity Whitepaper.https://www.nena.org/resource/resmgr/ng9-1-1_Project/ng911_and_cybersecurity_white.pdf

4.     SAMHSA. (2020). National Guidelines for Behavioral Health Crisis Care: Best Practice Toolkit.https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/national-guidelines-for-behavioral-health-crisis-care-02242020.pdf

5.     AFCEA. (2023). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2): Bridging Multi-Domain Operations.https://www.afcea.org/signal-media/defense/jadc2-bridging-multi-domain-operations 

6.     Mantzana, V. et al. (2020). Cyber-Physical Security in Critical Infrastructure. Springer.https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-46975-2

7.     Richardson, T., & Murphy, S. (2024). Fortifying Future Emergency Response: A Comprehensive Framework for Next-Generation 911 Security. ResearchGate.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376384739

8.     Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). (2023). Zero Trust Reference Architecture v2.0.https://www.disa.mil/-/media/Files/DISA/Services/Cybersecurity/Zero-Trust-Architecture-2-0.pdf 

9.     Chatham House. (2022). Cyber Resilience in NATO’s Command and Control Systems.https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/12/cyber-resilience-natos-command-and-control-systems 

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2023). Defense Support of Civil Authorities: DoW’s Role in Emergency Response.

https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105241